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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals of the State of Utah has 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(a) of 
the Utah Code 1953 as amended. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Robert D. Johnson, Third Party Defendant Judgment 
Debtor, hereinafter referred to as "Johnson", filed a 
"Motion to Quash Writ of Execution" and "Motion For 
Declarative Relief" on the 31st day of March, 1988. (TR pgs. 
67-68). 
The above motions were filed to stay the execution 
and sale of property, pursuant to a Writ of Execution served 
on Johnson March, 1988 by Harris Dudley Plumbing Co., Inc., 
a Utah Corporation, hereinafter known as "Harris" (TR Pg. 
59). The Writ was an execution on property, to-wit: a boat 
and trailer in his possession. The property was alleged to 
belong to a third party on whom Harris believed he had a 
civil suit claim and judgment based on a restitution order 
in a criminal case. State of Utah v. Irene Hook,Cr. No. 
87-172 (TR pgs. 2-55). 
Judge Raymond S. Uno, after several hearings 
concerning the Motion to Quash; a subsequent issue of the 
legal ownership of the boat and trailer and if there were a 
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fraudulent conveyance of the property to Johnson ruled as 
follows: That Irene Hook is the owner of the boat and 
trailer, there was a fraudulent conveyance of the property 
to Johnson and Johnson's Motion to Quash is denied. (TR pg. 
306-312). 
Johnson hereby appeals the final Judgment and 
Order of Judge Uno, in its entirety, as such ruling was not 
substantiated by the facts in evidence and is clearly an 
erroneous ruling based on the facts and the law pertinent to 
these facts, 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE ON APPEAL 
1. Whether or not the trial court committed 
reversible error in denying Third Party Defendant Debtor -
Johnson's Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution. 
2. Whether or not there was sufficient evidence 
to warrant the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law that there was any fraudulent conveyance of the boat and 
trailer. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case arises originally from a criminal 
proceeding and proceeds to become a quasi civil and 
eventually a civil matter with fraud alleged. It isr 
because of the convoluted nature of this case that Johnson 
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feels that some background information would be helpful. 
The criminal and original proceeding State of Utah 
v. Hook Cr. No. 87-172 began 1-06-87 (TR pg. 03-119). The 
criminal charges involved four counts of theft, second 
degree felonies, from the company of Harris-Dudley Plumbing 
and Heating Co. Inc. (TR pg 09-11). Ms. Hook, on April 6, 
1987,before Judge Uno, pursuant to a plea bargain, entered a 
plea of guilty to one (1) count of theft, a second degree 
felony and all other charges were dismissed. Ms. Hook was 
fined, placed on probation for 18 months and referred to 
adult Parole and Probation Dept. (TR 16-19). Ms. Hook was 
ordered to pay restitution "...to be determined by a 
restitution hearing if necessary. (TR p 18) (emphasis 
added). The relevancy of this will be apparent. The 
A.P.& P. determined Ms. Hook pay $10,000.00 restitution. 
She paid restitution on May, 1987. (TR 20-21). This is 
where the above does become pertinent to the civil nature of 
this case. On May 19, 1987 the Salt Lake County Attorney's 
Office informed the Court they wanted a hearing on the 
restitution as the A.P.& P. determination was not enough. 
(TR. P. 24,26). 
A non-evidentiary hearing was held before Judge 
Uno on the 21st day of September, 1987. He determined and 
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signed an Order that Ms. Hook would now owe another 
$399,000.00 restitution (TR P. 37-39). In this Order he 
also ordered that A.P.& P. collect the restitution. 
It is by this second determination of restitution 
that Harris claims the right to proceed against Ms. Hook and 
ultimately Johnson. Harris, on March 17, 1988, started 
civil proceedings against Ms. Hook to collect the money by a 
motion in Supplementary Proceedings. (TR P. 47) This was 
the only civil pleading in the whole case. On March 25, 
1988 Johnson was served with a Writ of Execution to execute 
and sell a boat and trailer that Harris alleged was owned by 
Ms. Hook and not Johnson. Upon receipt of this Johnson 
filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution. 
The matter was originally set for argument on 
April 4, 1988, the date before the execution sale (TR. P 
68). Intervening events concerning the legality of the 
restitution and Harris' desire to take depositions, (12 in 
all), delayed the matter to June 14, 1988. Other 
evidentiary hearings were heard August 5, 1988 and September 
19, 1989 before Judge Uno. (TR pg. 336, 337, 339). 
The first issue of these hearings became whether 
or not Johnson owned the boat and trailer at the time of the 
execution. The second issue was whether or not there was a 
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fraudulent conveyance of the boat by Ms. Hook to Johnson. 
The property in question on this appeal concerns 
a 24*2" fiberfoam boat and trailer owned by Johnson. The 
uncontradicted admissible facts presented in this case are 
basically that Johnson purchased this boat on February 26th 
or 27th, 1979 from Petersen Marine and subsequently sold 
a 2/3 interest to Ms. Irene Hook May 2 8, 1982. That on or 
about April 27, 1987 she transferred the boat and trailer 
back to him. (TR 63-64) (Exhibits A B & C TR. 65-66 
Evidentiary Hearing dated June 14, 1988). 
Judge Uno finally ruled that under Sec. 25-6-1- to 
13) U.C.A. 1953 as amended, attached appendix I, Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act, there was a fraudulent transfer of 
the boat to Johnson; therefore, he didn't legally own the 
boat and the Motion to Quash was denied. Mr. Johnson 
appeals this erroneous decision on the grounds there was 
insufficient admissible evidence on the record to support 
the judgment. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Johnson contends that the dearth of relevant and 
admissible testimony, both documentary and otherwise 
supports his argument that there is not sufficient evidence 
to support the Trial Courtfs findings. The only logical and 
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true conclusion would have been to grant the Motion to Quash 
and return the boat and trailer to Johnson. 
This argument for reversal is supported by 
Johnson's affidavit, (TR. pg. 63-66), Hook's affidavit,(TR. 
pg 141-145) testimony at the hearings and their depositions. 
Johnson's evidence together with that of Irene Hooks can 
only lead to one proper conclusion and that is that Johnson 
owns the boat and it should be returned to him. 
ARGUMENT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN DENYING THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT DEBTOR -
JOHNSON'S MOTION TO QUASH THE WRIT OF 
EXECUTION 
The following pertinent facts are uncontradicted 
and undisputed• Johnson purchased the boat and trailer in 
question in February, 1979; that on May 28, 1982 he sold an 
interest in the fiberfoam boat and trailer to Irene Hook 
(TR 129). The next transaction occured April 27, 1987, when 
Ms. Hook transferred the boat back to Johnson for release of 
a debt owed to Johnson by Ms. Hook. (TR 64,65 exhibit A) 
The consideration involved for the transfer was $6,000.00 he 
loaned her parents, $3,466.22 for payments and insurance 
Johnson paid for her Blazer vehicle, together with $5,000.00 
she still owed him on the boat. (TR P. 142 4) Ms. Hook's 
affidavit. 
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Documentation and evidence showing a valid 
transfer of the property are the statements, unrebutted by 
Harris, that Hook did sign the required documents for 
registration of the boat to Johnson in Wyoming and delivered 
the original bill of sale to Johnson. (TR. P. 142-143). At 
this time no titles on boats existed in the State of Utah. 
Johnson contends that the only testimony Harris 
has placed on the issue of the Motion to Quash is an 
affidavit filed by Mr. John R. Dudley, President of the 
Company Harris-Dudley Plumbing Company (TR P. 116-118). His 
entire affidavit is not shown to be based on any legal, 
documentary or other evidence and further states conclusions 
of law that clearly are not admissible. The affidavit is 
self serving and does nothing to counter Johnson's 
legitimate claim to the property. 
The testimony elicited from Johnson about his 
relationship with Ms. Hook was remote in time and totally 
irrelevant to the issues before the Court. None of it 
should have been allowed in evidence to be used in rendering 
a decision. 
The evidence presented by Harris was not competent 
to establish ownership of the boat. The documentary 
evidence he introduced was a Utah Title of Registration 
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which only showed what was on the State's computer at the 
time. On the other hand, Johnson's documents showed a 
signed off title to the trailer and registration of 
ownership of the boat to him in Wyoming together with the 
bill of sale. Harris did not present any evidence on the 
Motion to Quash. 
For Harris to prevail, the Trial Court had to find 
evidence that Ms. Hook owned the boat and that this was a 
valid civil judgment collection proceeding. 
"Civil Rule authorizing non exempt 
property to satisfy a judgment may not 
be used where the property may be 
subject to valid claims of other 
creditors". (emphasis added) 
Fort Collins Production Credit Ass'n v. 
Carrol Dairy, 553 P. 2d 95. 
In Johnson's case evidence clearly and convincingly shows 
not only a valid claim on his part but legal ownership. 
"In order for property to be property subject to execution, 
it must be owned by the party against whom judgment was 
entered". Kulic v. Albers, Inc. 532 P. 2d 603. Irene Hook 
did not own the boat upon which the execution was issued. 
The sole and only purpose of the hearing before Judge Uno 
was to determine whether or not the Motion to Quash a Writ 
of Execution on property owned by Johnson should have been 
granted. As a corollary some evidence was necessary to 
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establish Johnson's legitimate prior claim to the property. 
Johnson claims he has sustained his burden while Harris has 
not* 
The function of the Court of Appeals as an 
appellate Court is to review the record and determine 
whether there is a reasonable basis therein for the ruling 
made by the Trial Court. Sears Roebuck and Co. v. Walkerf 
621 P. 2d 938. The Court of Appeals must determine whether 
Johnson is entitled to a Judgment of reversal as a matter of 
law. Johnson has established all the viable evidence 
showing his ownership and the legal and pragmatic rationale 
for all transactions. There is no reliable substantial 
evidence to the contrary by the opposing party, just 
innuendoes and hearsay, and some fear. (See Irene Hooks 
deposition pages 28, 34-36 et seq. 12-11, 110 & 111.) 
Johnson's unrebutted evidence alone stands for a finding of 
no reasonable basis whatsoever for the trial Court's ruling 
in this matter. 
Harris's evidence on the other hand was 
irrelevant, hearsay, remote and did not focus on the issue 
and although in the record most was stricken as remote and 
hearsay. As the Court stated in Pelcher v. State Dept. 
Social Services, 663 P 2d 450. 
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"Matters not admitted into evidence before 
the trier of fact will not be considered on 
appeal". 
Johnson contends this Court should completely 
disregard the testimony of James Crafts and Marcia A. 
Eldridge. Johnson is aware of the challenging standard set 
down by the courts in gaining a reversal on appeal of a 
Trial Court as stated in Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 
776 P 2d 896. 
"To mount a successful challenge to the 
correctness of Trial Court's Finding of 
Fact, appellant must first marshal all 
evidence supporting finding and then 
demonstrate that all evidence is legally 
insufficient to support findings in 
viewing it in light most favorable to 
the Court below". 
Johnson contends that in the preceding pages and 
argument this has been accomplished. Johnson ascribes to 
the theory espoused in Harlene v. Campbell, 782 P 2d 980. 
"that...findings of the Trial Court will be disturbed if 
there is no substantial record of evidence to support them". 
Again the record speaks emphatically for Johnson's right to 
have the lower court's decision reversed. The findings in 
this case should be disturbed as they are not based on 
substantial, competent and admissible evidence. See Smith 
v. Ut. Cent. Credit Union, 727 P 2d 219 Horton v. Horton, 
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695 P 2d 102. The Court should follow this tenant 
and reverse this case, based on Martins v. Metzer, 591 P 2d 
541, where it said: .. . " will disturb Trial Court's 
findings when...left with a definite and firm conviction on 
the entire record that a mistake has been made, even though 
there may be evidence to support the findings". 
Harris failed in sustaining his evidentiary burden 
of proof of clear and convincing evidence. The record on 
appeal clearly preponderates against him and the Trial 
Court's findings should be reversed. See Parks Enterprises, 
Inc. v. New Century Realty Inc., 652 P 2d 918. 
In the case before the Court there is absolutely no 
evidence to support the Court's findings. The only 
admitted evidence before the Court on this issue of boat 
ownership is that of Johnson and Hook. Their testimony 
clearly places the ownership with Johnson. 
ARGUMENT II 
THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
TO SUPPORT THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW THAT 
THERE WAS A FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE 
OF THE BOAT AND TRAILER BY HOOK 
The issue of fraudulent conveyance was not 
properly before the District Court and Johnson objected to 
the matter being heard. However, assuming that issue was 
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properly before the Court, there is no evidence to support 
the Court's findings. (Evidentiary Hearing held June 14, 
1988, P. 25,26) It should be noted that if Mr. Dudley's 
affidavit, was in any way pertinent to the case it was fully 
and completely answered and rebutted by the affidavit of Ms. 
Hook. Harris has no evidence to justify any of his claim. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held...."that once 
contested the burden is upon the one 
alleging the fraudulent conveyance to 
prove by clear and convincing evidence 
that the transfer was in fact fraudulent", 
(emphasis added) Jensen v. Eames, 30 Utah 
2d 423, 519 p 2d 263; Baccalero v. Bee 
126 p 2d 1063 Am Jur 2d See 166. p. 833 
Johnson contends that nowhere in the volumes of 
pleadings and testimony has Harris introduced any reliable 
relevant evidence to portray any intent of Ms. Hook or 
Johnson to perpetrate any fraud. If we go through the most 
rudiment indicia of a fraudulent conveyance there is no 
evidence to support the Trial Court's judgment. The courts 
have usually looked at the following "badges of fraud" in 
considering the determination thereof and Harris's evidence 
didn't prove any of them. 
There was (1) no indication of proof of 
concealment of the transfer and (2) no proof of insolvency 
of Ms. Hook. Although both parties were having financial 
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problems, for instance she had to mortgage her home for 
$10,000.00 to pay the original restitution order and 
Johnson's business was faltering. Further, she received no 
cash money, stock, or any other real financial gain from the 
transfer, she received a release of a previous debt. (3) 
There was no evidence that the transfer was made in 
anticipation of any lawsuit. In fact she thought it was all 
over when she paid the fine and $10,000.00 in restitution 
originally ordered. (4) There is no false statement as to 
the consideration received as it is documented by the 
parties all through out the hearing. See generally Dahnken 
Inc., v. Wilmarth, 726 P2d 420. 
Even under Sec. 25-6-5 U.C.A. 1953, as amended 
Harris fails to meet the requirements needed for a 
fraudulent claim before or after transfer made. 
(1) He didn't show it was made with actual 
intent, to hinder, delay or defraud any creditor and (2) 
without receiving a reasonable equivalent value in exchange 
for transfer (emphasis added) 
Again, we see that under case law and the statute 
itself Harris has failed to meet his burden of proof. The 
principle is clearly espoused by E. Cleary, McCormick on 
Evidence, 286:2d Edition 
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"The burden of pleading and proof with regard to 
most facts have been and should be assigned to Plaintiff who 
generally seeks to change the present state of affairs and 
who therefore naturally should be expected to bear the risk 
of failure of proof or persuasion." 
Harris has failed to meet his burden of proof and persuasion. 
Under §76-3-201 (3) (a) (1) and (2) U.C.A. 1953 as 
amended, .... "a civil penalty may be included in a sentence 
and a judgment for restitution can become a lien in a civil 
action, and be treated procedurally as all other civil 
cases". The way this statute is worded precludes any other 
interpretation than once the lien is there the party that 
wishes to take advantage of this remedy must follow the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Harris should have filed a 
Summons and Complaint and named Hook as the Defendant. Then 
the issue of fraudulent conveyance could have been properly 
addressed by the Court. 
It should be noted, that the law to which the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are cited as legal 
grounds, was not in effect at the time the alleged 
fraudulent transfer took place. This act applies when any 
transfer occurred after the effective date of the act. The 
effective date, pursuant to Utah Constitution, Article VI 
Sec. 25, for laws 1988, Chapter 59 which appear as §§25-6-1 
to 25-6-13 was April 25, 1988. The Court will take notice 
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that all activities in this case took place in 1987 and 
prior thereto.. 
Testimony to be of any value must be admissible, 
it must be relevant, and to be relevant it must be used to 
establish a material proposition and fall within the 
exceptions of the hearsay rule. The evidence proffered by 
Harris does not meet that standard and the trial judge 
finally agreed. He disallowed the testimony of Mr. James 
Craft and Marci^ Eldridge as hearsay. (Evidentiary Hearing 
dated September 19# 1989 P. 80-83). 
CONCLUSION 
This Qase, contrary to its voluminous nature, 
simply stated is, should the Motion to Quash the Writ of 
Execution have been granted? Appellant Johnson contends 
that it should Qertainly have been granted. 
WHEREFORE, Appellant Johnson prays that this Court 
reverse the judgment and Order of the District Court by 
finding there w^s insufficient evidence to sustain a finding 
of a fraudulent transfer of the boat and trailer and 
therefore the Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution should 
have been granted and the boat returned to Johnson 
forthwith. * 
DATED this /V day of ///^Uf ,1990. 
MA1*T BILJANIC/V 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to Macoy A. 
McMurray, Attorney for Third Party Judgment Creditor, The 
Hermes Building, 455 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111, postage prepaid, this /V %ay of 
, 1990. My. 
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UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT 25-6-1 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — The Doctrine of Part 
Performance as Applied to Oral Land Con-
tracts in Utah, 9 Utah L. Rev. 91. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 71 Am. Jur. 2d Specific Per-
formance §§ 19, 20. 
C.J.S. 
§§ 44, 45. 
Key Numbers. 
39 et seq. 
81 C.J.S. Specific Performance 
Specific Performance 
25-5-9. Agent may sign for principal. 
Every instrument required by the provisions of this chapter to be supkcribedi 
by any party may be subscribed by the lawful agent of such party 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2478; 
C.L. 1917, § 5825; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
33-5*0. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Authorization from only one joint tenant. 
Husband could not bind wife, who was joint 
tenant, by contract to purchase the common 
property since she had not signed the contract 
nor given written authority to agent to sign for 
her. Williams v. Singleton, 723 P.2d 421 (Utah 
1986). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 72 Am. Jur. 2d Statute of Key 
Frauds § 379 et seq. 116(1). 
Numbers. — Frauds, Statute of *=> 
CHAPTER 6 
UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER 
ACT 
Section 
25-6-1. 
25-6-2. 
25-6-3. 
25-6-4. 
25-6-5. 
25-6-6. 
Short title. 
Definitions. 
Insolvency. 
Value — Transfer. 
Fraudulent transfer — Claim 
ing before or after transfer. 
Fraudulent transfer — 
ing before transfer. 
Claim 
aris-
aris-
Section 
25-6-7. 
25-6-8. 
25-6-9. 
25-6-10. 
25-6-11. 
25-6-12. 
25-6-13. 
Transfer — When made. 
Remedies of creditors. 
Good faith transfer. 
Claim for relief — Time limits. 
Legal principles applicable to chap-
ter. 
Construction of chapter. 
Applicability of chapter. 
25-6-1. Short title. 
This chapter is known as the "Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act." 
1953, 25A-1-1, enacted by L. 
§ 1; recompiled as C. 1953, 
History: C. 
1988, ch. 59, 
25-6-1. 
Comparable Provisions. — Other jurisdic-
tions that have adopted the Uniform Fraudu-
lent Transfer Act include: Arkansas, Califor-
nia, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Minnesota, 
Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Okla-
homa, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, 
Texas, Washington, and West Virginia. 
Compiler's Notes. — This chapter was en-
acted as §§ 25A-1-1 to 25A-1-13; it has been 
renumbered and all internal references cor-
rected accordingly under instruction from the 
21 
76-3-104 CRIMINAL CODE 
76-3-104, ^Misdemeanors classified. 
(1) Misdemeanors are classified into three categories: 
(a) Cla&s A misdemeanors; 
(b) Class B misdemeanors; 
(c) Class C misdemeanors. 
(2) An offense designated a misdemeanor, either in this code or in another 
law, without specification as to punishment or category, is a class B misde-
meanor. 
History: C. 1953, 76-3-104, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-104. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Cooper v. Utah, 684 F. Supp. 1060 
(D. Utah 1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal C.J.S. — 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 11. 
Law § 30. Key Numbers. — Criminal Law «=» 27. 
76-3-105. Infractions. 
(1) Infractions are not classified. 
(2) Any offense which is an infraction within this code is expressly desig-
nated and any offense defined outside this code which is not designated as a 
felony or misdemeanor and for which no penalty is specified is an infraction. 
History: C. 1953, 76-3-105, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-105. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Cooper v. Utah, 684 F. Supp. 1060 
(D. Utah 1987). 
PART 2 
SENTENCING 
76-3-201. Sentences or combination of sentences allowed 
— Civil penalties — Restitution — Definitions — 
Aggravation or mitigation of crimes with manda-
tory sentences — Resentencing. 
(1) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a 
person adjudged guilty of an offense to any one of the following sentences or 
combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal from or disqualification of public or private office; 
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PUNISHMENTS 76-3-201 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; or 
(e) to death. 
(2j This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to 
forfeit property, dissolve a corporation, suspend or cancel a license, or permit 
removal of a person from office, cite for contempt, or impose any other civil 
penalty. A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(3) (a) (i) When a person is adjudged guilty of criminal activity which has 
resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it 
may impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitu-
tion up to double the amount of pecuniary damages to the victim or 
victims of the offense of which the defendant has pleaded guilty, is 
convicted, or to the victim of any other criminal conduct admitted by 
the defendant to the sentencing court unless the court in applying the 
criteria in Subsection (3)(b) finds that restitution is inappropriate. 
Whether the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inap-
propriate, the court shall make the reasons for the decision a part of 
the court record. 
(ii) When a defendant has been extradited to this state under 
Chapter 30, Title 77, or has been transported at governmental ex-
pense from one county to another within the state for the purpose of 
resolving pending criminal charges, and is adjudged guilty of crimi-
nal activity in the county to which he has been returned, the court 
may, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, order that the 
defendant make restitution for costs expended by any governmental 
entity for the extradition or transportation. In determining whether 
restitution is appropriate, the court shall consider the criteria in 
Subsection (3)(b). If the court determines that restitution is appropri-
ate or inappropriate, the court shall make the reasons for the decision 
a part of the court record. The court shall send a copy of its order of 
restitution to the Division of Finance. 
(b) In determining whether or not to order restitution, or restitution 
which is complete, partial, or nominal, the court shall take into account: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that 
payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obliga-
tions of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment 
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of 
restitution and the method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitu-
tion inappropriate. 
(c) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of 
the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow him a full 
hearing on the issue. 
(4) As used in Subsection (3): 
(a) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is 
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits 
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of 
committing the criminal conduct. 
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(b) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general 
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil 
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's crimi-
nal activities and includes, but is not limited to, the money equivalent of 
prbperty taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses such 
as earnings and medical expenses. 
(c) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary 
damages to a victim, including insured damages. 
(d) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has suffered 
pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities. "Vic-
tim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's criminal activi-
ties. 
(5) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that 
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order 
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances 
in aggravation or mitigation of the crime. 
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a 
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation, or pre-
senting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed 
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to 
the time set for sentencing. 
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposi-
tion of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in 
the case, the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports 
received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation 
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence 
introduced at the sentencing hearing. 
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and 
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term. 
(e) The court in determining a just sentence shall be guided by sentenc-
ing rules regarding aggravation and mitigation promulgated by the Judi-
cial Council. 
(6) (a) If a defendant subject to Subsection (5) has been sentenced and com-
mitted to the Utah State Prison, the court may, within 120 days of the 
date of commitment on its own motion, or at any time upon the recom-
mendation of the Board of Pardons, recall the sentence and commitment 
previously ordered and resentence the defendant in the same manner as if 
he had not previously been sentenced, so long as the new sentence is no 
greater than the initial sentence nor less than the mandatory time pre-
scribed by statute. The resentencing provided for in this section shall 
comply with the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council to eliminate 
disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing. Credit 
shall be given for time served. 
(b) The court shall state the reasons for its sentence choice on the 
record at the time of sentencing. The court shall also inform the defen-
dant as part of the sentence that if the defendant is released from prison, 
he may be on parole for a period of ten years. 
(c) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnaping, 
rape of a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse 
of a child, the defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and 
if the charge is set forth in the information or indictment and admitted by 
50 
PUNISHMENTS 76-3-201 
the defendant, or found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant 
shall be sentenced to the aggravated mandatory term in state prison. This 
subsection supersedes any conflicting provision of law. 
History: C. 1953, 76-3-201, enac ted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-201; 1979, ch. 69, § 1; 
1981, ch. 59, § 1; 1983, ch. 85, § 1; 1983, ch. 
88, § 3; 1984, ch. 18, § 1; 1986, ch. 156, § 1; 
1987, ch. 107, § 1. 
A m e n d m e n t Notes . — The 1986 amend-
ment redesignated former Subsections (6) to 
(10) as (a) to (e) of Subsection (5), revised an 
internal statutory reference in the first sen-
tence of Subsection (3)(a), substituted "Subsec-
tion (5)" for "this section" and added "nor less 
than the mandatory time prescribed by stat-
ute" to the end of the first sentence of Subsec-
tion (5)(c), and made other, minor word or capi-
talization changes throughout the section 
The 1987 amendment designated the con-
tents of former Subsection (3)(a) as Subsection 
(3)(a)(i), inserted Subsection (3)(a)(n), redesig-
nated the provisions of Subsection (5) as last 
amended by Laws 1986, ch 156, § 1, added the 
last sentence to Subsection (6)(c), and made 
minor changes in phraseology and punctuation 
throughout the section 
Cross-References . — Removal of officers, 
§ 77-6-1 et seq 
Restitution as condition of probation, 
§ 77-18-1 
Sentence, judgment and commitment, Rule 
22, R Cnm P 
Special release from city or county jail, pur-
poses, conditions and limitations, § 77-19-3-et 
seq 
Uniform misdemeanor fine/bail schedule, 
Code of Judicial Administration, Appendix F 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality 
Arrest record 
—Effect on sentence 
Credit for pretrial detention 
Discretion of court 
Informal procedure 
Probation 
Restitution 
—Right to challenge 
Restitution to insurance company 
Review 
Statement of reasons for sentence 
Cited 
Constitutionality. 
The minimum mandatory sentencing 
scheme set forth in Subsections 76-5-404 1(4), 
76 3-201(5) to (10), 76 3-406(1), and 77-27-9(2) 
and this section is not unconstitutionally 
vague State v Gerrish, 746 P 2d 762 (Utah 
1987) 
Arres t r ecord . 
—Effect on sen tence . 
Defendant's view that the trial judge was 
unduly influenced by defendant's arrest record 
in imposing concurrent sentences of up to five 
years for two counts of aggravated assault was 
purely speculative, particularly in light of 
unanimous recommendations of the prosecutor 
and the Departments of Corrections and Adult 
Probation and Parole that defendant receive a 
prison sentence State v McKenna, 728 P 2d 
984 (Utah 1986) 
Credit for pretrial detention. 
Defendant's request that the trial court or-
der that credit be given for the period of time 
he spent in pretrial detention was outside the 
limits prescribed and therefore beyond the 
court's power, since the power to reduce or ter-
minate sentences is exclusive with the Board of 
Pardons State v Schreuder, 712 P 2d 264 
(Utah 1985) 
Discretion of court. 
Where the statute under which the defen-
dant is convicted mandates imposition of one of 
three stated minimum terms, trial courts have 
discretion to weigh the circumstances in aggra-
vation or mitigation of the presumptive term of 
middle severity in order to arrive at a just sen-
tence State v Lovell, 758 P 2d 909 (Utah 
1988) 
Informal procedure. 
This section contemplates a comparatively 
informal procedure State v. Bell, 754 P 2d 55 
(Utah 1988) 
P roba t i on . 
The probationary time period imposed by the 
court may be longer than the maximum time of 
imprisonment authorized for commission of the 
offense State v Allmendinger, 565 P 2d 1119 
(Utah 1977) 
Restitution. 
—Right to challenge. 
Defendant waived the right to challenge the 
order of restitution, where he lodged no objec-
tion to the imposition, amount or distribution 
of the restitution ordered, did not request a 
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